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Perspectivalism, A-theorism, and their Interpretation of QM
Abstract We motivate and develop an A-theory of time and probe its implied interpretation of quantum
mechanics.  It  will  emerge that,  as a  first  take,  the time of relativity  is  a B-series and the time of
quantum mechanics is an A-series. There is philosophical motivation for the idea that mutual quantum
measurement happens when and only when the systems’ A-series become one mutual A-series. This
accounts almost trivially for many quantum phenomena, including that the electrons of a Bell pair do
not have definite spins ‘until’ measurement, as ‘until’ here is an A-series notion.
[references in the process of a format change]
 
1 Introduction and Outline
In 1908 Minkowski’s published a paper on time and space, giving ‘Minkowski space’, whose invariant 
encodes special relativity and allows for the generalization to general relativity (Minkowski 1908). 
Also in 1908 McTaggart’s paper on time was published, where he distinguished between two series that
characterize time: the A-series and the B-series (McTaggart 1908). In spite of these happening 112 
years earlier than this writing, there has arguably not been a clear consensus on the union of these 
epochal insights. The theory of this paper is a probes one possible attempt at such a union.1.
Explored below, we will take Minkowski space to be given by the metric
∆s2 = – ∆t2 + ∆x2 + ∆y2 + ∆z2              (1)
setting aside the issue of constants for now. This metric has a signature of (– + + +).
We will take McTaggart’s A-series and B-series to be given by
(1.1) A-series is that series that runs from the future into the present and then into the past, and includes
some notion of ‘becoming’.
(1.2) B-series is that ordering that distinguishes between earlier times and later times. This is an 
invariant ordering for time-like worldlines (but not space-like worldlines).
Almost all philosophers call a theory of time with both an A-series and a B-series an ‘A-theory’, the 
idea being that A-theorists (almost always) presume the B-series anyway. We’ll follow this convention, 
but it must be understood that one dimension of time in this paper involves both the A-series and the B-
series.
Perhaps the most acute issue is that relativity seems to be inconsistent with the ‘now’ or a ‘present’ 
moment. We’ll handle this by suggesting 1. on a first take, the time of relativity is a B-series, and the 
time of quantum mechanics is an A-series, and 2. each closed quantum system has an ‘ontologically 
private’ A-series (see below), and 3. when the A-series of two systems ‘become’ to be the same A-
series, then and only then the two systems (mutually) quantum mechanically observe (‘measure’) each 
other and then form one system.
1 To put my cards on the table, I am a presentist (Markosian 2016).
It seems odd to have one system have one A-series and another system to have an ontologically 
different A-series: the ‘now’ of the Experimenter is not the same as the ‘now’ of the Cat in the 
Schrodinger’s Cat experiment, for example. But this seems less odd than the received implication of 
special relativity that there is no ‘now’ at all. 
It is vital that this interpretation is independently philosophically motivated (see below).
The plan of the paper is as follows
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2 Minkowski (1908), McTaggart (1908) 
In Minkowski space there are 4 dimensions and its metric is given in terms of one time parameter and 
three space parameters, (t, x, y, z) (eq. 1) (Minkowski 1908). 
The three space parameters accord with our experience, but the 1 time parameter does not. As 
McTaggart explained, time that accords with our experience is given by 2 series, the A-series and the 
B-series. For our purposes, McTaggart, also in 1908, defined the A-series, τ, as that temporal series 
which runs from future to present and then to past, and the B-series, t, as that series which runs from 
earlier-times to later-times (McTaggart 1908). τ and t can be varied independently (depending on the 
situation) so a notion of time that accords with our experience cannot be given by just one temporal 
parameter t. 
Thus, to model 'spacetime' that accords with our experience, it could be argued, we need the five 
variables (τ, t, x, y, z). In this 'McTaggartian spacetime' or 'AB-spacetime' or ‘A-spacetime’, τ 
represents the position of an event in the A-series of a given system, t represents the position of the 
event in the B-series of that system, and x, y, and z represent the spatial positions of the event in the 
chosen coordinates of that system. This is worth emphasizing: AB-spacetime is given by five variables 
and not four as in the case of Minkowski space.
A ‘system’ for the purposes of this paper can be any closed system and in particular is not assumed to 
be macroscopic or conscious to the extent humans are. It will be assumed that any of the systems under 
consideration in this paper can be considered to be microscopic, including ones called ‘E’, ‘Cat’, 
‘Alice’, or ‘Bob’. 
Just as the B-series can be coordinatized by a unit 'second', the A-series can be coordinatized by a unit 
'e' (the name 'e' does not designate electric charge in this context). 'e' is the unit of becoming, namely, 
becoming from the future into the present and then into the past of a selected system. A change of 1 
second is a change in the B-series, and a change of 1 e is a change in the A-series.
The countdown to a rocket liftoff, 10… 9… 8… could be seen as counting the number of es. When the 
announcer says ‘10’ this means that the liftoff, if it is going to happen, is 10 e in the future of the 
control center. In the case of ‘flat’  AB-spacetime, in the relevant coordinate system, the liftoff is also 
10 seconds later than the time that the announcer says ‘10’.
3 AB-series time
McTaggart (1908) identified two different series that characterize time. There is the B-series and the A-
series.
“Positions in time, as time appears to us prima facie, are distinguished in two ways.
Each position is Earlier than some, and Later than some, of the other positions. And
each position is either Past, Present, or Future. The distinctions of the former class 
are permanent, while those of the latter are not. If M is ever earlier than N, it is 
always earlier. But an event, which is now present, was future and will be past.” 
 
I will not follow McTaggart to the conclusion that time is unreal, but suggest that time is real and has 
both B-series and A-series characteristics, as most A-theorists posit. 
The B-series is a series of times ordered by the relation of 'earlier-than' (or 'later-than'). The B-series is 
usually thought of as going from earlier times to later times. The B-series relations do not change on 
time-like worldlines. Also, going 'backward in time' in the B-series just means going to earlier times.
I would argue, as many A-theorists do, the A-series, as not reducible to the B-series in any way, is also 
a part of a comprehensive view of time. The A-series consists in the ‘ontologically private’ (defined 
below) now and becoming. In contrast to the B-series, the A-series values change. The B-series allows 
going 'backward in time' and the A-series does not, discussed below. 
'I'll meet you 2 hours from now'. B-series time. 'Tomorrow never comes' (if taken literally). A-series 
time.
It is a Zen observation that 
“Time constantly goes from past to present and from present to future. This is true,
but it is also true that time goes from future to present and from present to past.”
(Suzuki 1986, p. 17 or 33). The former is the B-series (interpreted as 'earlier-times to later-times') and 
the latter is the A-series. As in several theories of time, instead of asserting 'time goes from past to 
present to future', it would be more appropriate to assert 'time goes from earlier times to later times as it
becomes from future to present to past'. As later and later times become present, time goes on.
The question is how to incorporate the A-series in physics, while of course retaining the B-series, into 
what I will for the purposes of this paper call the AB-series, denoting that a single dimension of time 
has both A-series and B-series characteristics, in a way that is consistent with relativity. The ideas here 
are related to those of Fragmentalism, Relationalism, and Perspectivalism (Fine 2005, Rovelli 2019, 
Dieks 2019). The idea will be to add to each system a 'now' and a 'becoming' (of the A-series) that is 
'ontologically private' to that system, while retaining the ontologically public B-series interrelations. 
These are 'private' now's, so, presumably, the apparent 'universal now' that humans live in on earth 
would result from some kind of averaging over the more-or-less ubiquitous private nows.
4 Perspectival Dualist Panpsychism
One significant virtue of the interpretation of quantum mechanics of this paper is that it is 
independently philosophically motivated.
I am conscious, and this is certain to a degree even greater than the certainty that there are physical 
laws. But there is, in one sense, nothing special about my composition—I'm made of electrons and 
quarks etc. Thus there is good reason to think that the basic elements that make up my brain are 
accompanied by the basic elements of consciousness—subjective experience—qualia. One is lead to 
the hypothesis of Panpsychism, for example an electron is accompanied by a quale—a subjective 
experience—for example, the color green, and perhaps a muon is accompanied by a blue quale. There 
has been an impressive an amount written about this and surrounding ideas but the basic idea is clear 
enough and is called (Dualist) Panpsychism. (SEP 2017, SEP 2020a). (The idea of other correlates to 
qualia such as complexity could be entertained.)
Qualia are not a theory. Reading about qualia does not help one apprehend (and thereby understand) 
them any more than reading about swimming across the English Channel helps one actually swim 
across the English Channel. But that is good: an advance in this area should lie outside the physicist’s 
mainstream conceptual toolkit, since otherwise the interpretation would surely have been put forward 
already. 
'Ontological privacy' is basically what happens with the Inverted Spectrum (SEP 2020b). Suppose Alice
looks at the leaves on a tree and she experiences the color green. She cannot know, in some ontological 
sense, that if her friend Bob looks at the same leaves he experiences the same (color) quality.
 
Now suppose they look at a color circle. Alice's color spectrum does not determine Bob's color 
spectrum, for Alice. Bob could have a systematically 'opposite' color experience. This is basically the 
Inverted Spectrum. Indeed, it may be that Alice has a single definite spectrum, whereas Bob's spectrum 
can vary over a wide range of spectrums or even other possibilities, for Alice. Alice's (qualitative) 
experience while looking at the leaves, in some ontological sense, leaves Bob's experience without a 
definite value (for Alice), and therefore this color-parameter is 'ontologically private'.
In Dualism it is a hopelessly frequent observation that my ‘green’ might not be the same as your 
‘green’. More precisely, if I see some leaves and green qualia arise in my mind and if you look at the 
same leaves, then I don’t know for sure if the qualia that arise in your mind are what I would call green,
and vice versa. There is no fact of the matter as to whether we see the same ‘green’. (It’s irrelevant if 
we actually do see the same green—the point is there no ontic state that contains qualia from both 
perspectives. Now migrate this observation to each physical closed system, no matter how microscopic.
This might be called “Perspectival Panpsychism” where there is no fact of the matter as to whether the 
qualia associated with one system are the same (qualitatively) as the qualia associated with another 
system.
The theory of time probed in this paper posits that the A-series characteristics of time are (or could be) 
ontologically private. A consequence would be that an Experimenter’s 'now' does not determine when 
the Cat’s 'now' is, to some extent, in the Schrodinger’s Cat experiment, and vice versa . This is, 
possibly, more plausible than the conclusion that the ‘now’ does not exist at all as in the received 
interpretation of relativity. 
One wants ontological parsimony. It may indeed be Alice’s ‘green’ is the same as Bob’s ‘green’.  But 
that is irrelevant. The point, in this theory, is there in no ontic state that includes both Alice’s qualia (or 
her A-series) and Bob’s qualia (or his A-series) simultaneously.  So that result should be in the 
ontology, if possible.
Is time qualia or merely similar to qualia? (Berg 2010, Farr 2019, 2020c, Smolin 2015) This paper will 
not attempt to adjudicate the issue. The question seems to be whether epistemic apprehension of time 
presupposes ontological time in some sense. See Chalmers’ Two-dimensional argument against 
materialism (Chalmers 2007). 
5 Note on Qualia and Tense 
Philosophers of time have developed tense logics and many others. Tense in this paper is associated 
with the A-series. And the A-series is supposed to be (or be like) the phenomenal, i.e. qualia. Therefore 
it is plausible that to get a start on finding the logic of qualia one could take a tense logic and modify it 
appropriately. 
One might be willing to entertain the idea that, in obvious notation, the modal axiom
◊P→P        (2)
is true for the A-series but false for the B-series. If it is true for the A-series then the mere possibility of 
the A-series presupposes the A-series. This is plausible: the possibility is itself temporally situated. Also
one might suspect this is true of qualia and false of their physical correlates (Chalmers 2007).
6 McTaggart on Newton
“Absolute, true, and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows equably without 
relation to anything external, and by another name is called duration: relative, apparent, and common 
time, is some sensible and external (whether accurate or unequable) measure of duration by the means 
of motion, which is commonly used instead of true time; such as an hour, a day, a month, a year. ” 
(Newton 1689). 
Without getting litigious, we can parse this as 
“Absolute, true and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature flows equably without regard 
to anything external, and by another name is called duration” This is the A-series.
“relative, apparent, and common time, is some sensible and external (whether accurate or unequable) 
measure of duration by the means of motion, which is commonly used instead of true time; such as an 
hour, a day, a month, a year.” This is the B-series.
What’s new is the constraint of being consistent with relativity (Einstein 1905). This is handled by the 
B-series of the respective systems in this preliminary theory, though with further development it surely 
will turn out that both the A-series and the B-series are involved in some way, in addition to the spatial 
coordinates, among the transformations in these coordinates.
7 Simultaneity versus the Present
7.1 The following argument is often made. For changes in relevant motions of a spaceship in this 
galaxy, the planes of simultaneity change for events in (for example) the Andromeda galaxy. But this 
argument can be turned around. For changes in relevant motions of a spaceship in the Andromeda 
galaxy, its planes of simultaneity for events in this galaxy change. Yet we do not find that our (and thus 
each microscopic system's) 'now' goes back and forth ‘in time’ depending on the movements of the 
spaceship in Andromeda. The A-series seems to go in only one direction: future into the present and 
then into past.  
Suppose this alien moves around the Andromeda galaxy. Depending on how it moves, the alien's plane 
of simultaneity may be, for example, in our (in the Milky Way, here on earth) future, or in our past, or 
varying. But that does not prevent us from seeming to exist only 'now'
7.2 Consider a third rocket ship in (for example) the Sombrero galaxy. Depending on how it moves, its 
planes of simultaneity could also vary. Generically, a plane of simultaneity of the rocket ship in the 
Andromeda galaxy will not be a plane of simultaneity of the rocket ship in the Sombrero galaxy. There 
are multiple planes of simultaneity going on at once. But then the plane of simultaneity cannot be 
equated with the ‘present’, as having multiple presents would violate its ontological privilege. So the 
presentist does not have the option of equating simultaneity and the present available.
. 
7.3 If the sun suddenly went out we wouldn’t get its effects here on earth for about 8 minutes. 8 
minutes compared to what?
7.4 In music there is tempo. A-series. And there is relative location in the score (including relative 
duration). B-series.
7.5 There is a need for two temporal buttons to select a video on Google video. t is how much later than
the beginning of the movie the end is. τ can be interpreted as how far into the past the movie has been 
posted.
8 The interpretation
There is philosophical motivation for the idea that quantum observation of a system happens when and 
only when the A-series of the quantum system comes becomes to combine with the A-series of the 
reference system. The 'now' of the quantum system combines with the 'now' of the reference system 
into one ‘now’. Thus, in Alice's perspective, Alice measures the spin in a direction of (an) electron 
when and only when the A-series of Alice and the A-series of the electron-pair become one A-series. 
Before observation, there is no fact of the matter as to whether the 'now' of Alice is the 'now' of the 
electron-pair. Thus, the spin does not decide—so to speak—which definite value to take on until there 
is a 'now' of the combined Alice-pair system. The ‘until’ here is an A-series notion. 
Since at least Heraclitus it has been observed that the flow of time (the A-series) is (or is like) what we 
would now call phenomenal consciousness, i.e. qualia. This is a robust observation for the presentist. 
Thus we have the obvious hypothesis that the A-series of one system is not the A-series of another 
system. There is no fact of the matter whether the ‘now’ of one system is ‘at the same time as’ the 
‘now’ of the another system (see section after Schrodinger’s Cat). But clearly there must be just one 
‘now’ when the two systems come together to form one system.
“How does the [quantum] universe know when to apply unitary evolution and when to apply 
measurement?” (Aaronson 2020d). 
The theory of time of this paper posits that unitary evolution applies when two systems do not share the
same A-series, and a quantum measurement applies when the two systems come to (or 'become to') 
share the same A-series.
 
9 Figures
Here is a picture of one dimension of AB-series time for one selected system:
Figure 1
 
As later and later B-series times become from the future into the present and then into the past in the A-
series, time goes on. 
9 Figure 2
This is another construal of the model
t_1 is earlier than t_2 which is earlier than t_3... The earlier-times to later-times timeline stays in one 
ordering (of one kind or another), but the whole timeline moves from future to present to past, with the 
present staying put. (The present does not 'move up the B-series' as in some spotlight theories because 
ipso facto the presents wouldn't be ontologically privileged.) As later and later B-series times become 
present, time goes on.
The arrow in the figures is probably given by an operator, in light of sections below
Toward justifying the figures. One cannot say there is a 'now' in one location on the B-series and there 
is a different 'now' somewhere else on the B-series because then neither 'now' would be ontologically 
privileged ipso facto. Ontological privilege implies there is only one 'now'. Yet since there is only one 
'now' different 'times' would require different locations on the B-series.
Figure 3
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There should be a way to represent the A-series 'becoming'. The B-series doesn't change (except space-
like separated events, a triviality for us). So the A-series and the B-series must change relative to each 
other while keeping the same 'now'. The above picture is modified to
Figure 4
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This accords with experience.
Heraclitus’ river metaphor may be diagrammed as
Figure 5
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10 Ontological Privacy 
An ontologically private parameter may be defined as one that takes on a definite value when a system 
S specifies its own ontic state, but does not take on a definite value in a different system S'. This could 
be because, for S, 1. S’ has no such parameter, 2. S’ has such a parameter but it does not have a definite 
value, or 3. there is a parameter and it has a definite value but it is not known or knowable, for some 
reason (this latter might be appropriate for QBism (Fuchs et. al. 2014), though we are concerned 
primarily with realist interpretations in this paper). 
11 Perspectival Ontology
We do not assume that any of these systems are macroscopic nor conscious, but for conceptual reasons 
it will be convenient to state things in terms of the Schrodinger's Cat experiment in this section. In this 
theory a measurement from a system E on a quantum system Cat is in fact a mutual measurement 
between E and Cat. This is similar to several interpretations.
“The notions of observing system and observed system reflect the traditional notions of observer and 
system (but any system can play both roles here).” (Rovelli 1996). “ In this paper we ... suggest a 
perspectivalism according to which quantum objects are not characterized by monadic properties, but 
by relations to other systems. Accordingly, physical systems may possess different properties with 
respect to different "reference systems".” (Dieks 2019).
Suppose that for an experimenter E, Schrodinger’s Cat is in the state
       (3)
in a Hilbert space H. We will assume quantum mechanics is universal, in which case every physically 
instantiated system must be able to describe (so to speak), other systems via quantum mechanics 
(complications arising from field theories will not distract us in this note). 
Therefore, as described by Cat, E is in an analogous state
       (4)
in a different Hilbert space H''. The long-run statistics of the first and second terms in (3) and (4), 
respectively, must be the same, so in view of the Born rule we have
|c3| 2 =  |c1| 2  and  |c4| 2 =  |c2| 2        (5)
The state-vector [Ψ> collapses upon observation of Cat by E, and equivalently the state-vector [Ψ''>'' of
E by Cat collapses upon (mutual) observation. In the interpretation of this paper, at observation and 
only at observation the A-series of E and the A-series of Cat become the same A-series.
12 M5 × M5
But not so fast. It is the interface of AB-spacetimes from two ontologically distinct perspectives, such 
as E and Cat, that is (in this model) quantum. 
It could be argued that before quantum observation we in fact have (in changed notation)
(12.1) E's 5-dimensional AB-spacetime (τ, t, x, y, z) from the ontological perspective of E, 
  
(12.2) Cat's 5-dimensional AB-spacetime (τ', t', x', y', z') also from the ontological perspective of E
and
(12.3) Cat's 5-dimensional AB-spacetime (τ'', t'', x'', y'', z'') from the ontological perspective of Cat,
 
(12.4) E's 5-dimensional AB-spacetime (τ''', t''', x''', y''', z''') also from the ontological perspective of Cat
where 'before' means a quantum observation (such as E opening the box) is in the future of E and, 
analogously, in the future of Cat.  
The 5 dimensions come from the need for an A-series, a B-series, and 3 space dimensions for each AB-
spacetime.
Thus in E's ontological perspective there are in some sense two AB-spacetimes, the first one (12.1) and 
the second one (12.2). On the other hand, in Cat's ontological perspective, there are in some sense also 
two AB-spacetimes (12.3) and (12.4). So we would expect (12.1) and (12.2) on the one hand to be 
quantum mechanically related to (12.3) and (12.4) on the other hand.
What are the (not all independent) 64 (possibly stochastic) relationships between the 8 variables (τ, t, τ',
t', τ'', t'', τ''', t''') before, during, and after quantum observation? And what are the at least 625 
relationships between the 20 variables where the space coordinates are included? 
A further observation.
An experimental outcome is revealed to E in E's present, τ = 0, and must be in Minkowski space (in the
'flat' case), so that the metric of E's AB-spacetime, in E's ontology, at τ = 0, must conform to the 
Minkowski metric (setting aside constants throughout)
∆sAB-spacetime2 (at τ = 0) = ∆sMinkowski-spacetime2 = – ∆t2 + ∆x2 + ∆y2 + ∆z2        (6)
This raises the following idea. Suppose that, for general values of τ, 
∆sAB-spacetime2 = + ∆τ2 – ∆t2 + ∆x2 + ∆y2 + ∆z2         (7)
And suppose
∆t' = i∆t        (8)
Then
∆s'AB-spacetime2 = + ∆τ'2 + ∆t'2 + ∆x'2 + ∆y'2 + ∆z'2        (9)
 
Then, where (7) gives an AdS5 space (for E's AB-spacetime in E's perspective) in the coordinates (τ, t, 
x, y, z), and (9) gives an S5 space (for Cat's AB-spacetime also in E's perspective) (in changed notation)
in the coordinates (τ', t', x', y', z'). The same geometry clearly obtains for the two AB-spacetimes from 
Cat's perspective, in the coordinates (τ'', t'', x'', y'', z'') and the coordinates (τ''', t''', x''', y''', z'''), 
respectively. This, given the  supposition of this paper that E's perspective is related to Cat's perspective
quantum-mechanically (before mutual observation), cannot not be suggestive of an AdS/CFT 
correspondence (Maldacena 1998).  
13 Time-reversal
Time-reversal goes as
Figure 6
t_3 and then an earlier time t_2 and then an even earlier time t_1 become from Alice's future to her 
present and then to her past. As earlier and earlier times become present to her, time appears to be 
going in reverse. Time-reversal invariance obtains only for a B-series, on this view. Naive time-reversal
for an A-series is undefined. There's no unit of going from past to future defined in the A-series. (The 
evolutions in the graphs are path-connected via τ = 0.)
There is a time-reversal
(τ, t)  → (τ, -t)      (10)
This means that as events become in Alice’s A-series (from future to present to past), the B-series times
are going from later times to earlier times. This is the realization of the ‘movie going backward’ 
metaphor.  This is surely at least one of the notions of time-reversal in physics. 
These time-reversals are dubious:
(τ, t)  → (-τ, t)       (11)
                      
(τ, t)  → (-τ, -t)      (12)
except at τ=0 (or its generalization given by the presentism function p(τ) (see below)) because going 
from the past to the present to the future would have to go through Alice's present. (A disconnected 
present would be philosophically dubious.)
14 A Mathematical Definition of the Present and its Duration 
Let τ be a real variable that runs from a selected system’s future into its present and then into its past a 
la McTaggart’s A-series. We may define a unit of becoming, e, that coordinatizes τ the way seconds 
coordinatize McTaggart’s B-series earlier-times to later-times (e is not the electric charge in this 
context). By convention we will suppose that τ > 0 means the (A-series) time is in the selected system’s
future, τ = 0 is its present, and τ < 0 its past. 
One doesn't need to make the sizable assumption the present is a single infinitesimally small point 
centered at, for example, τ = 0. (It may be that the smallest duration is the Planck time anyway.) Define
for each τ a 'degree of presentness' p = p(τ), so the present may be spread out in A-series time 
somewhat. (Smith, 2010). By convention we will suppose p(τ) =1 means that τ is fully present, p(τ) = 0
means that τ is fully not present (thus either in the future or the past of the selected system), and 0 < 
p(τ) < 1 means that τ is partially part of the present. 
One may consider symmetric functions p, asymmetric functions p, step functions p, infinite-tailed 
functions p, normalized functions, etc. It would be philosophically dubious to have a disconnected 
function p.
In obvious notation, the block-world theorist would have p(τ) = 1 for all τ. The growing-block theorist 
would have p(τ) = 1 for τ ≤ 0. The presentist (like me) would suppose τ is at least partially present 
where p(τ) > 0 (i.e. on the support of p).
Suppose for the sake of argument that an A-series is associated with each physical system the way 
qualia are associated with each physical system in Panpsychism. Then it may be that one system has a 
presentism function p(τ) whereas a different system has a different presentism function p'(τ').
If for two systems p(τ) and p'(τ') are non-point-like then there would be some uncertainty as where in 
the present τ'' an event or process is if these two systems come to have the same A-series. So there 
would seem to be some kind of uncertainty relation here.
It must be emphasized that each selected system there are five not four variables, τ the A-series, t the B-
series, and the three space dimensions xa for a = 1, 2, 3, or, in view of section (12), each perspective has
10 variables. 
15 An Inequality
Suppose there is a presentism function p(τ) in ontological perspective p_1. Then, in that perspective, 
the A-series spectrum τ’ of another system can have any value (the ‘now’ could be anything in a certain 
range) up to an accuracy of p(τ’). But if the length of p is (for example) decreased, then the number of 
states of τ’ that are distinguishable is increased, in the perspective of p_1. It is exceedingly clear there is
an inequality here. 
16 Time T(τ, t)
 
This is not a theory of two time dimensions but one time dimension that has two closely related 
parameters τ and t, such that the time T is given by T(τ, t). τ is how far in the future an event is and t is 
how much later than an event is, compared to a possibly microscopic reference system, e.g. ‘Alice’. 
There might be functions f given by f(T(τ, t), xa) for a = 1, 2, 3.  
For one dimension of time T(τ, t) and three dimensions of space the flat Euclidean metric is given by
ds2=dT 2(τ , t)+∑
i=1
3
dx i
2      (13)
Any experimental outcome is revealed to Alice only in her present. Alice’s present (or at least the 
center of it) is the condition τ = 0. (The general condition would use the presentism function p(τ) 
discussed earlier.)  Also, any experimental outcome that Alice gets must be Lorentz-invariant, i.e. in 
Minkowski space, in the flat case. Thus for this simple case one has
ds2=dT 2(0 , t)+∑
i=1
3
dx i
2=−dt 2+∑
i=1
3
dx i
2      (14)
which imply
dT (0 , t )=idt      (15)
This says the difference in time T is, in Alice’s present, equal to i times the difference in B-series clock 
times.
Light is associated with a constant c that has units of meters per second. It is reasonable to wonder if 
there is something associated with a constant b that has units of meters per e. The thing would move a 
constant number of meters for every unit of becoming into Alice's present. This might be infinite in 
light of the 'Bell' section below.
Reverting to the standard notation of this paper, the condition that t = t’, in appropriately scaled units, 
says that the event is simultaneous in both frames of reference, the un-primed frame and the primed 
frame. This is, of course, not the same condition that the event is in both presents, which would be the 
condition τ = τ’ in appropriately scaled units (of e and e’ respectively). The latter condition cannot be 
given in the A-series coordinates of two different systems.
The idea, then, is that Alice has an at least partly 'ontologically private' spacetime. This is 5-
dimensional in the sense of (τ, t, xa) or 4-dimensional in the sense of (T(τ, t), xa). Similarly for Bob. The
interface of these spacetimes is taken to be quantum mechanical.
17 Definitions and Rates
Mathematicians were taking square roots of positive numbers, e.g. finding x in the equation x2 = 1. But 
one wanted to generalize to equations like x2 = -1. There was no real number that did it, so to a real 
number mathematicians added a non-real parameter i. That is, i is a kind of standardized place-holder 
for a would-be root, whatever kind of creature that is.  
One thing to try, then, is to start with a parameter t whose unit is change in B-series, an interval, in for
example seconds. Add a parameter τ whose unit is not an interval in B-series clock time: in AB-theory,
τ is part of the A-series, and “e” will be a unit of what temporal becoming is like per second, as a kind
of standardized place holder, whatever kind of creature it is. Let τ be the future-present-past spectrum. e
coordinatizes τ.
Define an indexical clock to be a clock that's not accelerating, has relative velocity 0, and is spatially 
local, to a centered inertial reference frame, all in terms of a B-series.
Define 
1 e is what becoming is like for 1 second of indexical clock time 
If becoming is indeed phenomenal in the way that qualia are, then, it could be argued, it must be 
'defined' or 'referred to' in this curious 'what it is like' way, on salient views. E.g. a green quale is 
defined as 'what it is like' to experience green. The necessity of doing this has to do with their 
ineffability. e can be well-defined across systems. 1 second is well-defined across systems such as Alice
and a protozoan, even though the protozoan doesn't have the mental capacities Alice does. It's plausible
that it's the same way with 1 e of A-series time. Just the way one can re-define seconds to be longer or 
shorter than the usual seconds, one can re-define es to be further or closer into the future than the usual 
es. The physically significant stuff should be invariant under these changes.
It is worth reiterating that one needs more than 4 numbers to locate an event in AB-spacetime. For the 
time T(τ, t) these five numbers are τ, t, and xa. One specifies τ, how far in the future/present/past the 
event is, and t, how much later than t = 0 the event is, and the three xa.  
Define  
 
1 sec./e = d(Alice's B-series)/d(Alice's A-series)
is the change in 1 second of indexical clock time per change in e. For example, the position of a particle
at 1 sec. later than t = 0 is also 1 e closer to the present from the future (or further into the past).
Consider the rate r = 2 sec./e. This can be interpreted as meaning there are 2 seconds of indexical clock 
time per unit of becoming. Presumably, the 2 seconds are in a series. That would seem to imply that, for
1 e, 2 seconds go by, so earlier-to-later relations would appear to go by faster. This would be like the 
‘speeded up movie’ metaphor.
Let the rate r be in units of sec./e. The general idea is
r > 1 B-series time appears sped up (earlier-times to later-times appear to be going by faster than 
normal)
r = 1 the change in B-series information per change in A-series information is given by 1 second of 
indexical clock time per unit e of becoming. This unit e is assumed to be applicable to all 
panpsychist systems, the way 1 second of indexical clock time is applicable to such systems 
as a macroscopic Alice or a protozoan.  
0 < r < 1    B-series time appears slowed down, as in relativistic dilation between Alice's B-series and 
Bob's B-series, according to either Alice or Bob
r = 0 B-series time appears stopped (but the appearance goes on [ref.])
r < 0 one appears (from future to now to past) to be going backward in B-series time, i.e. later than to 
earlier than times, e.g. time-reversal
One may define (for example) dr/de which would have something to do with the rate of becoming 
accelerating. e-2 would be something like “per unit of becoming, per unit of becoming”.
Let clock c2 be above the surface of the earth and clock c1 be 1 meter directly above c2. Let c2’s time be 
given by T(τ, t) and c1’s time be give by T’(τ’, t’). c2 runs slower than c1. So
dt/dt' < 1 sec./sec.'      (16)
Each clock registers that later and later respective times are becoming into their respective presents at a
rate of 1, i.e.
dt/dτ = 1 sec./e, dt'/dτ' = 1 sec.'/e'                  (17)
which allow one to attempt to define, in the obvious units, 
dt/dτ' < 1, dt'/dτ > 1      (18)
One could possibly compute 
dT'/dT      (19)
but has to be careful as it seems to put the ontologically private ‘total times’ T and T’ on an equal 
footing.
Let x be the position of a point particle defined relative to a chosen origin in a particular system. One 
may define dx/dt, the 'rate' at which the position of the particle changes with respect to the B-series 
time t, i. e. with respect to the 'time' going from earlier times to later times, in units of meters/second. 
One may define dx/dτ, the 'rate' at which the position of the particle changes as it 'becomes' from the 
system's future into the system's present and then into the system's past, in units of meters/e. This 
neither assumes nor implies the future is predetermined, as there may be many futures which are 
consistent with the system's present (see below).
The countdown to a rocket liftoff, 10… 9… 8… could be seen as counting the number of es. (Though 
of course the countdown is in an arbitrary coordinate system.) When the announcer says ‘10’ this 
means that the liftoff, if it is going to happen, is 10 e in the future of the control center. In the ‘flat’ case
of AB-spacetime the liftoff is also 10 seconds later than the time that the announcer says ‘10’. This 
particular case might be given by the rate r = -1 sec./e . (The value of the B-series goes up as it passes 
by the present while the value of the A-series goes (‘becomes’) down into the present.)
An AB-clock. Take a piece of paper and write 'now' on it. Put a stop-watch next to it and start it, starting
at any chosen value. The paper is 'now', and it can be modeled by (via a distribution on) the variable τ 
via the presentism function p(τ). The stop-watch measures how much later than dinner is tonight than 
the present value, or how much earlier breakfast was this morning than the present value. The 
increasing-in-value (in a convenient coordinate system) of the stop-watch is represented by the arrow in
the figures above, i.e. the A-values of an event in AB-spacetime change and the B-values don't change 
(up to space-like separation), (McTaggart 1908), i.e. the 'becoming' is represented by the arrow in the 
figure. The value on the stop-watch is an empirical question, as is the reality of the paper.
18 Ontic States (OM)
There is the question of the relationship between a quantum state and an ontic state. One would like to 
associate a quantum state with a particular ontic state, but the quantum state might not specify which 
one uniquely, so in the Ontological Models framework (OM) one models a quantum state as a 
distribution D over all ontic states (Leifer 2014). These are parameterized by at most one time variable 
t. In AB-theory there is a distribution D1 over the ontic states parameterized by (τ, t, t') (Alice’s A-
series, Alice’s B-series, and Bob’s B-series) and there is a distribution D2 over the ontic states 
parameterized by (t, t', τ') (Alice’s B-series, Bob’s B-series, and Bob’s A-series) . There is no 
distribution D3 over states parameterized by (τ, t, t', τ'), as there would be in a non-perspectival model, 
because τ and τ’  are ontologically private, in (or analogous to) the way the qualia of Alice and the 
qualia of Bob are ontologically private, where ‘Alice’ and ‘Bob’ could be any possibly microscopic 
system. This seems to be a kind of knowledge-restriction (Spekkens 2005). There's more information in
D1 union D2 than there is in D3, but only one, D1 or D2, can be given. So you only get about half of 
the total information. 
A C-series or R-series might be appropriate (McTaggart 1908, Oaklander 2015).
19 Probability Distributions
In this theory there is no ontic state that contains both Alice’s A-series and Bob’s A-series while they 
are different systems. Therefore there is no well-defined probability distribution over one.
This has an exact analogue (equivalence?) to the case of Alice's qualia and Bob's qualia. The question 
is, what is the probability that, for example, Alice sees green and Bob sees yellow, when they each look
at some leaves, given the spectrum-inversion possibilities. There is no ontological state that contains 
both Alice's qualia and Bob's qualia (in Perspectival Dualism), so there is no probability distribution 
over one. Instead there is the probability distribution over 'Alice sees green and Bob sees yellow' 
according to Alice's ontology and her map of Bob's ontology, and there is a probability distribution over
'Alice sees green and Bob sees yellow' according to Bob's ontology and his map of Alice's ontology. 
Thus the probability that one has 'Alice sees green and Bob sees yellow' in one and the same ontology 
is the product of these two distributions. 
Let pobjective(τ, t, τ’, t') be a probability distribution over the 4 time variables all construed as 'objective'. 
Let pAlice perspectival(τ, t, t') be a probability distribution over 3 temporal variables from Alice's perspective, 
and pBob perspectival(τ', t', t) be a probability distribution over 3 temporal variables from Bob's perspective. 
It's conceivable that some function of pAlice perspectival and pBob perspectival, that meets the requirement of being 
a probability distribution, could deviate from, or indeed not allow a corresponding model for, pobjective. 
(This is a calculational question.) If that were the case, there would be the hope of experimentally 
adjudicating between our being in an 'objective', 'perspectival', or something else, ontology.  
For example, define sets A = {1, 2, 3} and B = {1', 2', 3', 4'}. Assuming equiprobability of all 
possibilities (just for this example), what's the probability of picking, for example (2, 3'), at random? 
pobjectival (2, 3') = 1/12. But this also assumes all possibilities are 'equally real'. What's pperspectival(2, 3')? 
One has, in this case, the possibility of 3' given (conditional on) the state 2, for Alice. i.e., she finds 
herself to be in one definite state, either 1 or 2 or 3, which in this case is 2. In this case there is a 1/4 
chance of the B value to be 3', according to her. She could have been in any one of the three conditional
states, however, which brings in an extra factor of 1/3. In other words, according to her, who is actually
in state 2, there was only a 1/3 chance that she would have wound up in state 2 (i.e. been in state 2 
when the probability was going to be calculated). So, for her, the probability of the mutual state being 
(2, 3') is pAlice(2, 3') = 1/12. This must be multiplied by the conditional probability from Bob's 
perspective, as there must be a consensus, as it were, from both perspectives, that (2, 3') is the selected 
state. In this case (2, 3') also has a probability of 1/12, as for Bob there are 3 possible states for Alice, 
each conditional on Bob's states, so pBob(2, 3') = 1/12.
One has 
pperspectival = pAlice(3' | 2) pBob(2 | 3')      (20) 
Thus, the probability that they agree on (2, 3') is (1/12)x(1/12) = 1/144. In this case, generally,
pperspectival ≠ pobjectival      (21) 
The former is the square of the latter, and sums to 1 if the latter does. Informally, one has
     (22)
for probability distributions pperspectival and pobjectival. They can both sum to 1 because there are more 
perspectival possibilities than objectival possibilities.
20 Born
This section is somewhat speculative.
In view of (7) let us optimistically put for Alice time T1 = (0, 0) and time T2 = (τ, it), normalized in 
some way. We can ask what is the probability that they become the same time, T1 = T2, at collapse? 
There is a probability pA(T1 → T2). Here, T2 is in the future of T1, by τ, and also T2 is later than T1, by t. 
But pA is not the answer. An experimental outcome is revealed only in the present, τ = 0. So we would 
seem to want the probability p' (T1(0, 0) and T2 = (0, 0)) but that's not right since these two times are 
ontologically private. We want the probability (see figure 7) 
pAB = pA(T1 → T2) and pB(T3 → T4)      (23)
to actualize the path from both perspectives, Alice’s and Bob’s, where time T3 = (0, 0) and time T4 = (τ, 
-it). T2 has a ‘+ it’ because T2 is later than T1, while T4 has a ‘- it’ because T4 is earlier than T3. This 
gives
pAB = pApB((T1 → T2) and (T3 → T4))      (24)
Figure 7
T_1
T_2 T_3
T_4
T2 is later thanT1, where τAlice at T1 = 0. T4 is earlier thanT3, where τBob at T3 = 0. They come together 
only when (τAlice and τBob) → τAlice and Bob = 0    
Also pAB = pApB. The first transformation in (24) is followed by the second transformation in (24) which
are given by (τ, it) × (τ, -it) so that we have pAB│T2│2, or, equivalently, pAB│T4│2.
This is the probability of the actualization of that temporal path from both perspectives. 
          
The probabilities pA and pB are just 'probabilities', and not, in particular, some mysterious things that 
have the ontology of merely a 'square root' of a probability or indeed a 'complex square root' of a 
probability. A product of probabilities is a probability, pAB. 
It's critical that to get the probability of the actualization of the path one has the probability of pA of (T1 
to T2) from the perspective T1, and the probability pB of (T3 to T4) from the perspective of T3. Before 
observation (collapse of the state function) they are not ontologically one system over which one 
distribution could be given.
21 Schrodinger's Cat
We will assume the reader is already fluent with the Schrodinger's Cat paradox (SEP 2019). Suppose 
the experimenter is Alice. At some point (time) during the experiment, Alice describes the cat's state as 
a superposition, in obvious notation, [psi> = [meowing> + [purring>. Yet at that time the cat describes 
its own state as being in one definite state, either 'meowing' or 'purring', and not in the superposition 
[psi>. What's going on?
The problem from the perspective of the AB-theory is that we assumed the A-series values of the cat 
are the same as the A-series values of Alice. But the ‘now’ of Alice and the ‘now’ of the cat are taken to
be ontologically private. Therefore the 'now' of Alice does not determine (fix) the 'now' of the cat (and 
vice versa), if they are separate systems, analogous to the case of qualia in the Inverted Spectrum. The 
ontology ought to reflect that, if possible. In this case, to some extent, Alice cannot determine when the 
'now' of the cat is. In particular, she cannot assume that the ‘now’ of the cat is equivalent to her ‘now’. 
This is so from the beginning of the experiment (when she closes the box) until the end of the 
experiment (when she opens the box).  
But if, during the experiment, Alice and the cat never are in a shared present, or shared 'now', then there
is arguably never a single time at which the cat gets ascribed different states, one by Alice and one by 
the cat. That is how the paradox is resolved in this interpretation.
Alice is supposed to describe the cat state in terms of time. We do not have a function 
f(T(τ, t), T'(τ’, t’))      (25)
because it treats τ and τ’ on an equal footing, up to T = T'. For the interesting function g, with a 
Cartesian product x, one has
g(T(τ, t), t’, T(τ, t) x τ’)      (26)
where the third term comes from the idea that, for each of Alice’s times T, the ‘now’ of the cat, τ’, could
take on any value (on the future/now/past spectrum of the cat). But it's not clear if g has τ and τ' on an 
equal footing, too.  (The above form of g is just an exuberant example.)
22 Three Arguments the Future is not Predetermined
(22.1) state-vector collapse in quantum mechanics is random (to within the relevant probabilities). 
(22.2) quantum statistics in Bell experiments: Suppose there are two entangled electrons. Suppose 
Alice chooses of her free will the orientation of her detctor and measures the orientation of the spin of 
the electron that goes through her Stern-Gerlach device. Suppose Bob then (sufficiently after Alice) 
chooses of his free will the orientation of the detector ‘behind’ his Stern-Gerlach device and measures 
the orientation of the spin of the electron that goes through this device, at an event that is space-like 
separated from Alice's choice and measurement outcome. One expects the classical correlations in 
experiments. But one gets greater-than-classical correlations, namely the quantum correlations. 
  
Suppose the statistics of this (entangled) pair of electrons, even if up only to stochasticisity, is a 
function of events/processes in the intersection of their past lightcones. Extrapolating backward, one 
obviously gets to the big bang. This, super-determinism, establishes all correlations in the universe at 
the big bang. But then why don't we see greater-than-quantum correlations? … Certainly, there would 
be correlations up to 100% in the long-run statistics. But we never observe such greater-than-quantum 
correlations, only quantum correlations. Therefore, the observed statistics of the universe are not 
consistent with the theory of super-determinism. Instead, they are consistent with free will. 
(22.3) free will in some philosophical senses: these are already persuasive to many researchers (SEP 
2020b).
23 Counterfactuals
There is the issue of counterfactuals. If Alice closes the box when the cat is purring, and the cat is 
purring when she opens the box, then it's not clear why the intermediate quantum state should depend 
on the counter-factual [meowing>. In the AB-theory one might speculate there are two future states 
consistent with Alice's present, namely meowing and purring. Neither future state can be ruled out 
'now'. (Recall the 'now' is the only A-series time at which the value of an experimental outcome is 
revealed to Alice.) So they can't be absolutely nothing, but they can't be factual, either. So it would 
seem that both future states, as regarded, 'now', have the nature of a counter-factual while the box is 
closed. This makes sense. While neither future state can be ruled out 'now', neither future state can be 
ruled in, either, in Alice's 'now'.  
24 Maps
One wants to model, starting with time t, a map to the quantum state  
      (27)
and, building on that, if possible, a map via the Born rule to the real value of an experimental outcome
     (28)
However instead of starting with a single real time variable, t, we now have a function g (which is just 
an example) such that
     (29)
But there’s not enough information in  to model (28) and it treats T and T’ on an equal footing. So 
one might try a function like
     (30)
The Schrodinger equation can be written
     (31)
The first time variable in the left-hand side should be something like τ or perhaps the complete time 
T(τ, t) or even just t’. The second time variable, τ, in the left-hand side is apparently an A-series. The 
time variable τ in the right-hand side is also apparently an A-series. These are initial guesses. It's not 
clear whether operator H itself is a function of just one A-series or something more, or nothing. 
Obviously this generalizes by relativist corrections, via perhaps through something like dT/idt’, a 
different example given by  . 
     (32)
Of course the function j was just an exuberant example.
25 Bell
Suppose Alice and Bob are space-like separated and the pair of electrons goes to each of them and 
Alice decides on the orientation of her detector and then measures the spin of a relevant electron. 
Suppose Bob then does the same at a sufficient time after Alice. There is the well established notion 
that Alice can’t send Bob a signal (about what spin he will eventually measure) faster than the speed of 
light. There is also the notion that when Alice measures her electron’s spin, she immediately knows the 
spin of Bob’s electron. But quantum mechanics says something more than this. It says Alice’s result, 
for an angle chosen by Alice, will at least sometimes instantaneously affect the result that Bob will 
eventually measure, for the spin of his electron, at an angle chosen by him, and this effect can be non-
local. Non-locality has been experimentally verified under satisfactorily weak assumptions (SEP 2019).
This instaneousness is the condition τ = τ’ = 0 for the future/present/past spectrum of Alice, τ, and the 
future/present/past spectrum of the pair of electrons, τ’. This is, in this particular case, not merely the 
assertion that τ and τ’ have the same numerical value, but that Alice and the pair have the same A-
series, including the same ‘now’. But this means that the ‘now’ acts as a non-local hidden variable. 
But not so fast. One could contend the variable is not actually ‘hidden’ at all and is in fact one of the 
most ‘un-hidden’ variables known to us, even more so than that there are objects existing outside one’s 
mind (where the thought of an object is itself temporally situated). One might say it acts as a non-local 
self-evident variable.
The non-local move here is that the electrons do not have the same past ‘before’ observation. This 
dependence would have to be in Alice’s past and equally in the pair’s past but these pasts do not have 
simultaneous values. There is no fact of the matter ‘when’—in Alice’s A-series—the ‘now’ of the 
electrons are, if state is a function of their own A-series. From the ontological perspective of Alice, the 
electron-pair simply did not have the relevant properties before observation, and vice versa, because 
there was no unified notion of a ‘now’ in which to have physical properties.
26 Quantitative Agreement with Mermin’s Example of Non-locality
We closely follow the exposition in (Wikipedia 2020d). Suppose that Alice describes—so to speak—
and electron-pair as being in state 
[Ψ> = c1 [01> + c2 [10>      (23)
This form presupposes a basis but [Ψ> can be written in the basis of any relevant spatial orientation.
Suppose now that Alice’s and Bob’s detectors are at π rad relative to each other. Then when they 
measure the spins they will get a 100% correlation. For a second experiment suppose that after the 
electrons are fired but before the spins are measured Alice turns her detector by θ = 1 rad. The 
correlation of the spins will be less than 100% by some small amount f1. For a third experiment suppose
Alice does the same as in the second experiment and Bob does the same as Alice but rotates his 
detector in the opposite way from Alice by 1 rad from the anti-aligned detector position. Then if the 
electron pair had spins before observation by Alice and Bob we would have a maximum deviation of 2 
× (θ deviation) = 2f1 for the local case.
But in the AB-time theory it is trivial to violate this. The electrons do not posses definite spins for Alice
nor Bob until their A-series become one, i.e. until mutual observation the pair system with the Alice-or-
Bob system. Thus there is a 2 rad deviation from the anti-aligned detectors at the observations and not 
two 1 rad deviations. Before observation there is no universal ‘now’ in which the 1 rad rotations have 
taken place. We could choose any function we want because we are talking about the correlation at 2 
rad and not two correlations at 1 rad. We may take the deviation at 2 rad to be f2 = (2θ)2 = 4f1. But we 
have just argued that the classical case has a maximum violation of 2f1. In fact f2 is the value given by 
quantum mechanics. QED.   
27 Change in Entropy as a Function of the A-series and B-series
For the entropy, S, of a system the second law of thermodynamics may be stated (SEP 2009)
     (24)
In this equation the variable t is a B-series. This is the change in entropy with respect to earlier times 
going to later times in the case of increasing t. We are led to the question of what happens when 
changes are defined with respect to the A-series.
One could define quantities Entropyt(t), Entropyτ(τ), and EntropyT(T). Informally speaking, one has
increasing Entropyt(t)   ↔  increasing t      (25)
(SEP 2009) which suggests
decreasing Entropyτ (τ) ↔  decreasing τ      (26)
where (26) says the A-series entropy of a system decreases as the system ‘becomes’ from the future 
through the present into the past. That could be because, for some system, there are more future 
microstates that could eventually become present, that are consistent with the microstates of the 
present, than there are present microstates states that are consistent with the present. 
An interesting condition is
 
      (27)
To reiterate, we have:
Figure 8
As later and later B-series times 'become' from the future into the present and then into the past in the 
A-series, time goes on. 
Times in the B-series get later-than to the right and therefore increase in seconds to the right, but the A-
series moves the whole B-series (in es) to the left. It will be assumed that the series have been 
coordinatized so that the size of 1 second is the same size as 1 e: an event that is 1 second later-than, 
when it becomes, becomes 1 e further into the present from the future or 1 e further into the past from 
the present. Thus
      (28)
This says the rate of change of earlier times to later times of the B-series, in terms of the 'becoming' of 
the A-series, for each system, is -1 sec/e. This is contra eq. (17).  
Given equation (28) we could also consider
       (29)
This says the total change in entropy with respect to t and τ is 0. But these are only two possible 
definitions for change in entropy. 
28 Open/closed Future and Past
(28.1) case 1: the future is pre-determined: given the present state of a system there is only one possible
future, fpre-determined(τ)
(28.2) case 2: the future is not pre-determined: given the present state of a system there are multiple 
possible futures fi(τ,  ). It is argued case (2) is the more plausible case in section (22).
An experimental outcome is given only in the present. But in case (2) there may be many futures f1, ..., 
fn that are compatible with the state of things in the present. There are many possible definitions of 
entropy of the future to be tried. Two of these are the sum of entropies at a future time (τ, t)
        (29)
and there is the possibility that the entropy at a future time (τ, t) is a function of all of the futures at that 
(future) time at once:
     (30)
Exactly the same considerations apply to the past. Thus,
(28.3) case 3: the past is fixed: given the present state of a system there is only one possible past, ppast(
fi(τ, t)).
case 4: the past is not fixed: given the present state of a system there are multiple possible pasts, pi
Case (4) is justified by the idea that experimental outcomes are given only in the preset, and there may 
be many pasts that are consistent with the present state of things. For example, it may be that at some 
earlier time in the past the function g = g(τ, t, p), where p is momentum, is consistent with the present 
state of billiard balls on a pool table. But it might be that another function of another triple g’(τ', t', p') is
also consistent with the present state of the balls, where g and g' are not compatible with each other (i.e.
are not a part of the same history).
For example suppose the cue ball is in the middle of the pool table and we know that it got there by 
being hit (in the past) by a solid ball. Evidently, the solid ball could have come from any direction on 
the pool table, assuming of course it was hit hard enough and in the right direction from its (further in 
the past) initial position. There is no present or future experiment that could adjudicate the among the 
possibilities. Therefore it should be the case that we do not assume there is (now) just one past. 
Therefore there are multiple pasts that are consistent wit the present. This is a challenge to the growing-
block hypothesis.   
The physicist could try many functions. For example one can find functions such that qualitatively one 
has
Figure 9
where only t and S(t) move (schematically), and they move to the left. And one can find functions such 
that qualitatively one has
Figure 10
where the present, τ = 0, is a minimum for the A-series entropy, S(τ) (for a B-series interpretation see 
Carroll et al. 2004). Either of figures (9) or (10) could be found given the right function in either case 
(28) or in case (30).
The physicist might also consider equations like
     (31)
and
       (32)
  
It may be that (31) can be ruled out on ontological grounds. We differentiate with respect to the A-
series variable τ first. This ends up giving us one A-series value for each of the B-series values t. But in
this case the A-series, and therefore the present(s), is (are) not ontologically privileged. This rules out 
equation (31). This would justify further study at the intersection of philosophy and physics.
29 Past Hypothesis
The Past Hypothesis is the hypothesis that the universe started in a state of low entropy and the entropy
has, on average, been increasing ever since (Carroll et al. 2005). This is a problem because—all else 
being equal— a state of low entropy is enormously less probable than a state of high entropy. Thus the 
beginning of the universe was enormously less probable than it should have been.
Given equation (27) or equation (29) the past hypothesis problem would possibly be solved in some 
sense. Here the A-series variable, τ, is related to how things could have been, given the way they are (in
the present) and the B-series variable, t, is related to how things are, given how they could have been (in
earlier times). This is an instance of 'two-dimensional semantics' (Chalmers 2007) and is also at the 
intersection of philosophy and physics. It may be that eq. (27) could help adjudicate between eq. (29) 
and eq. (30).
30 Big Bang
For any microscopic or macroscopic system Alice these are two different questions:
(30.1)  how much earlier than now was the big bang?
(30.2)  how far in Alice's past is the big bang?
The big bang may be getting earlier than the present, but that need not be at the same rate as the big 
bang going into Alice's past. For the sake of argument let the big bang be at time t = 0 and the time in 
which we live t = 14 billion years. This means the big bang is 14 billion years earlier than now. It is not
always necessary that τ = t (in appropriately scaled units of es and seconds, respectively).  It may be 
possible that, for example, τ →−∞ , in which case Alice must go infinitely far into her past before 
getting to the big bang. This interpretation would be the best of both worlds. The big bang could be 14 
billion before now (the B-series), but if one tried to go back through time into Alice's past, (the A-
series), in some models, one never gets all the way to the big bang. Of course this bears on the question
of whether there could have been a first moment of time.
1.1.4 the current time may be about 14 billion years later than the big bang. But why did the big bang 
not happen further in the past? For example, if the big bang happened instead 100 billion es further into
the past than it actually did, then the current ‘time’, so far as we are concerned, could still be 14 billion 
years later than it. The big bang and the present could both be 100 billion es further into the past, 
keeping the B-series constant. There are thus two different time symmetries: one for t and one for τ.  
Another scenario:
Figure 11
future
present
past
t=0
t=13.8
t’=0
t’=13.8
Supposing these B-series one at a time, in the B-series on the left the big bang is 13.8 billion years 
earlier than now. That is some particular distance in Alice’s past. In the B-series on the right the big 
bang is also 13.8 billion years earlier than now, but it has gone further into Alice’s past. There is the 
rate r = dt/dτ which is or averages 0 in these scenarios.
31 Synopsis of the Theory of Time
31.01. The motivation for this theory is in (31.04). The A-series is the future/present/past series and 
includes becoming and is a different series for each different closed physical system, no matter how 
small. The B-series is the earlier-times to later-times ordering for each system. 
31.02. The mutual quantum observation of two systems of each other happens when and only when 
their respective A-series become the same A-series. 
This is not an ad hoc hypothesis but is the result of a philosophical exploration (see (31.04).
31.03. In spite of the names and analogies it is not assumed that Alice or Bob or experimenter E or 
Schrodinger's Cat, Cat, are macroscopic or conscious (to a human extent). These are all merely stand-in
names for any two closed systems including microscopic systems.
31.04. In Perspectival Dualist Panpsychism there is, for two different systems Alice and Bob, no ontic 
state that contains specific values of both Alice’s qualia and Bob’s qualia. This is the philosophical 
observation that, in this theory, there is simply no fact of the matter as to whether my subjective 
experience of 'red' is qualitatively the same as your subjective experience of 'red' when we each look at 
an apple that we each call 'red' (‘spectrum inversion’ or ‘qualia inversion’). This is a somewhat 
common, but it might be argued, extremely robust observation. This is a 'perspectival' ontology. The A-
series of a system is like (or is?) qualia. Thus the crux of this theory is to suppose there is no ontic state 
that contains specific values of both Alice’s A-series and Bob’s A-series in a single AB-spacetime, until
mutual observation (measurement). 
31.05. Take, for example, an experimenter, E, and Schrodinger’s Cat, Cat. They do not share the same 
A-series while the experiment is underway (the ‘now’ of E is not the ‘now’ of Cat, and the 'becoming' 
of E is not the 'becoming' of Cat). Therefore during the experiment there is no time at which a 
contradiction in Cat's ascribed states (one by E and a different one by Cat) arises.
31.06. What might be called McTaggartian spacetime, or AB-spacetime, or A-spacetime, has the five 
coordinates τ, the position of an event in the future/present/past of a selected system, t, the position of 
the event with respect to the ordering of earlier-times to later-times (which is relative for space-like 
separated events), and the three space coordinates xa. The four dimensions of Minkowski space, with its
one dimension of time, t, is, in the viewpoint of this theory, outright incomplete. Also, Minkowski 
space from the point of view of our experience is, it could be argued, incomplete.
31.07. The B-series t is coordinatized by seconds, and the A-series τ is coordinatized by a unit of 
becoming e (e is not the electric charge in this paper).
31.08. Later and later times become from the selected system’s future into its present and then into its 
past. This does not assume the future (or past) is fixed.
31.09. One may envision (micro) islands of AB-spacetimes whose interfaces are quantum-mechanical.
31.10. If Alice’s A-series coordinate τ has a definite value then Bob’s A-series coordinate τ'' does not 
have a definite value, and vice versa. This is the temporal analogy (equivalence?) to qualia in 
Perspectival Dualist Panpsychism and is the crux of this theory.
31.11. One may usefully define rates such as dx/dt, dx/dτ, dt/dτ, etc., where, for example, dx/dτ is the 
rate of change in position with respect to becoming from future into the present and then into the past 
in the A-series of the selected system, and has units of meters/e.
31.12 There might be some metric on each island of AB-spacetime (here is just one example) such as 
(setting aside constants)
(∆sAB-spacetime)2 = + ∆τ2 – ∆t2 + ∆x2 + ∆y2 + ∆z2      (33)
At the risk of belaboring a point, is worth reiterating that AB-spacetime has five not four coordinates.
31.13. It might be that there is an island of E and an island' of Cat, both from E’s ontological 
perspective, and analogous islands, island'', island''' both from Cat’s ontological perspective. It requires 
further study to see if these two islands—from within a chosen perspective—have the same metric 
signature. But the perspectives would still be comparable only via a quantum theory until mutual 
observation, in this theory.
31.14. The probability pr(eA and B) of the actualization of an event eA and B when perspectives A an B come 
together is the probability of the event happening in perspective A, pr(eA) and the probability of that 
event happening from the perspective of B, pr(eB). Thus pr(eA and B) = pr(eA) × pr(eB).
31.15. The A-series variable τ and the B-series variable t can, depending on the situation, be varied 
independently. Therefore they cannot be the same temporal variable in all situations. Therefore any 
theory that aspires to be complete in some sense must account for both variables in one way or another.
31.16. The crux of this theory is (31.04) and leads directly to (31.02).
32 Other realist interpretations of quantum mechanics
It seems odd that two quantum systems would not share the same A-series, or the same 'now', until 
mutual observation. But, it could be argued, this is less odd than the notion that there is no 'now'--even 
for a particular selected microscopic system—which is one of the received implications of special 
relativity. Moreover, this proposal has a solid philosophical motivation, which, it might be argued, is in 
sharp contrast to the other realist interpretations of quantum mechanics on the table as of this writing 
(which I take to be Many-worlds, GRW, de Broglie-Bohm, and Retro-causality, (IEP 2020)).
Moreover, this encompasses an expression of the Copenhagen interpretation. Bohr: which measuring 
apparatus one is using must be specified in making predictions about an experiment (SEP 2019). In the 
theory of this paper, which measuring apparatus one is using must be specified because it must be 
specified which ontologically private A-series one is using to make predictions. 
33 Conclusion
A Bell electron-pair does not take on the pair of values of spins 'until' Alice measures one of the 
electrons, and visa versa, because the A-series past of Alice is ontologically not the same as the A-
series past of the electron system, until mutual measurement. In the theory of this paper, this 'until' is 
the point at which the A-series ‘now’ of Alice and the A-series ‘now’ of the electron-pair become one 
A-series ‘now’. This, it could be argued, makes it almost trivially easy to get Bell inequality violations 
in the physics. Definite values together are not taken on until the two A-series become one and have a 
shared ‘now’.
The AB-time interpretation might, optimistically speaking, be suspected of having a few virtues.  It 
takes into account both the A-series and the B-series for each system. And it is motivated by being the 
implication of a plausible philosophical argument. Most importantly, in its current stage of 
development, it could be argued, it seems to be in agreement with macroscopic experience.
34 References
1. Aaronson, S. (accessed 7/2020). qclec, Lecture 12, Thurs Feb 23: Interpretation of QM 
(Copenhagen, Dynamical Collapse, MWI, Decoherence), https://www.scottaaronson.com/qclec/12.pdf
2. Berg, H. (2010). MoL-2010-13: Philosophy of time: Combining the A-series and the B-series. 
Philosophy of Time, https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/838/ 
3. Brown, James Robert and Fehige, Yiftach, (2019). "Thought Experiments", The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/thought-experiment/>. The citation above 
refers to the version in the following archive edition: Winter 2019 (substantive content change)
4.Byrne, Alex, (2020). "Inverted Qualia", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2020
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/qualia-inverted/>.The citation above refers to
the version in the following archive edition: Spring 2020 (minor correction)
5. Carroll, S., Chen, J. (2004). Spontaneous Inflation and the Origin of the Arrow of Time, arXiv, 
0410270v1 , p. 9, Figure 2, bottom-right diagram.
6. Chalmers, D. (2007). The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism 
http://consc.net/papers/2dargument.html 
7. Dieks, D., (2019). Quantum Mechanics and Perspectivalism, https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.09307 
Rovelli, Carlo, 1996, “Relational Quantum Mechanics”, International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 
35(8): 1637–1678. doi:10.1007/BF02302261 
8. Einstein, A. (1905). ON THE ELECTRODYNAMICS OF MOVING BODIES. 
http://hermes.ffn.ub.es/luisnavarro/nuevo_maletin/Einstein_1905_relativity.pdf  
9. Farr, H. (accessed 2020) Explaining Temporal Qualia, European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 
10:8. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-019-0264-6 or  https://rdcu.be/b5B3M 
10. Faye, J. (2019). "Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics", The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy , Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/qm-
copenhagen/>. The citation above refers to the version in the following archive edition: Winter 
2019 (substantive content change)
11. Fuchs, C. A. (2014), An introduction to QBism with an application to the locality of quantum 
mechanics, American Journal of Physics, Vol. 82, Issue 8, 
https://aapt.scitation.org/doi/abs/10.1119/1.4874855 
12. Goff, Philip, Seager, William and Allen-Hermanson, Sean, (2020). "Panpsychism", The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/panpsychism/>. The citation above refers to the 
version in the following archive edition: Summer 2020 (minor correction)
13. Leifer, M. S. (2014). Is the quantum state real? An extended review of ψ-ontology theorems. arXiv, 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1409.1570v2 
14. Lewis, P. J. (accessed 7/2020, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Interpretations of Quantum 
Mechanics,   https://www.iep.utm.edu/int-qm/#H6
15. Maldacena, Juan, (1998). "The Large N limit of superconformal field theories and 
supergravity". Advances in Theoretical and Mathematical Physics. 2 (4): 231–
252. arXiv:hep-th/9711200. Bibcode:1998AdTMP...2..231M. doi:10.1023/A:1026654312961. 
16. Maroney, Owen, (2009). "Information Processing and Thermodynamic Entropy", The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/information-entropy/>. The citation above refers to
the version in the following archive edition: Fall 2009 (first archived) [new author(s): Maroney, Owen]
17. Markosian, Ned, (2016). "Time", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2016 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/time/>.The citation 
above refers to the version in the following archive edition: Fall 2016 (minor correction) [new 
author(s): Markosian, Ned; Sullivan, Meghan; Emery, Nina
18. McTaggart, J. M. E. (1908). "The Unreality of Time". Mind 17: 457–73, see also 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mctaggart/  
19. Minkowski, H. (1908). “Raum und Zeit” [Space and Time], Physikalische Zeitschrift, 10: 75–
88 Various English translations on https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Space_and_Time  
20. Myrvold, Wayne, Genovese, Marco and Shimony, Abner, (2019). "Bell’s Theorem", The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/bell-theorem/>. The citation above refers to the 
version in the following archive edition: Spring 2019 (substantive content change)[title change] [new 
author(s): Myrvold, Wayne; Genovese, Marco; Shimony, Abner]
21. Newton, I. (1689) Scholium to the Definitions in Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, 
Bk. 1 (1689); trans. Andrew Motte (1729), rev. Florian Cajori, Berkeley: University of California Press,
1934. pp. 6-12. 
22. Oaklander, N. L. (2015), Temporal Phenomena, Ontology and the R-Theory , Philosophy, 
Department of (UM-Flint) Vol. 16, No. 2,  https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/120241 
23. O'Connor, Timothy and Franklin, Christopher, (2020). "Free Will", The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/freewill/>. The citation above refers to 
the version in the following archive edition: Spring 2020 (minor correction)
24. Rovelli, C. (1996), "Relational quantum mechanics", International Journal of Theoretical 
Physics, 35: 1637-1678. 
25. Rovelli, C. (2019) “Neither Presentism nor Eternalism”, arXiv, 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1910.02474 
26. Robinson, Howard, (2017). "Dualism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/dualism/>.
The citation above refers to the version in the following archive edition: Fall 2017 (minor correction)
27. Smith, Q. (2010). Time and Degrees of Existence: A Theory of Degree Presentism, Cambridge 
University Press, 12 April 2010  DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246100010535
28. Smolin, L. (2015). Temporal naturalism, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, Volume 52, Part A, November 2015, Pages 86-
102, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1355219815000271 
29. Spekkens, R. W. (2005). In defense of the epistemic view of quantum states: a toy theory, arXiv,  
https://arxiv.org/abs/1409.1570v2 
30. Suzuki, Shunryu, (1995, p. 33; 2011, p. 17), second-to-last paragraph of the section “Control”, Zen 
Mind, Beginner's Mind, Weatherhill.
31. Wikipedia (2020). Bell’s theorem. Accessed 7/2020. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell
%27s_theorem 

